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CHALLENGES OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
CONFLICTS: A LOOK AT DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
JAMIE A. WILLIAMSON* 
During times of armed conflict, whether characterized as international 
or non-international, International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) is applicable. 
As a body of law, IHL does not question the lawfulness of a conflict (jus ad 
bellum) but seeks instead to apply humanitarian principles in warfare (jus 
in bello). IHL recognizes that even war has its limits, irrespective of its 
cause, and strives to establish humanitarian parameters to the means and 
methods of warfare and to alleviate the suffering that conflict so often 
causes to persons not taking part in the hostilities. The core IHL 
instruments are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, their two Additional 
Protocols of 1977, and Additional Protocol III of 2005. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) has been entrusted by states that are 
parties to the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols,1 and 
 
 * Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation for the 
United States and Canada. The views and opinions expressed in this article are mine alone and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the ICRC. 
 1. For instance, Articles 9, 9, 9 and 10 respectively of the four Geneva Conventions provide that 
“the present Convention constitute[s] no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International 
Committee of the Red Cross . . . may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, 
undertake for the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and chaplains, and for their 
relief.” Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 10, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions reads, “An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.” Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, art. 3; 
Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 3; Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 3. Article 126 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 143 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention recognize that the ICRC has permission to go to all places where protected 
persons may be, in particular those deprived of liberty, have access to all premises occupied by them, 
interview them without witnesses, and have full liberty to select the places of visit as well as the 
duration and frequency of the visits. The ICRC’s mission is to protect and assist the civilian and 
military victims of armed conflicts and internal disturbances on a strictly neutral and impartial basis and 
to promote compliance with IHL. The ICRC’s global presence is adjusted to respond to armed conflicts 
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through the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement (“Statutes”),2 with the “guardianship” of IHL. 
Tracing the history of the development of International Humanitarian 
Law during the twentieth century, it could be argued that IHL evolved to 
address new humanitarian concerns arising from the then existing conflicts. 
Thus after the Second World War, we saw states calling for greater 
protection of civilians during armed conflicts and an extension of the 
earlier Conventions to better address concerns relative to wounded and sick 
in armed forces in the field and at sea, and to prisoners of war. The addition 
of Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions marked an important 
step forward in that, even in non-international armed conflicts, a minimum 
of protections would be ensured for persons taking no part in hostilities or 
those who are hors de combat. 
Similarly, with the adoption of the two additional Protocols in 1977, 
more than a quarter of a century later, states sought to deal with aspects of 
human suffering not covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Provisions 
on the conduct of hostilities and of combatants, traditionally found within 
the “Law of the Hague,” were included.3 Additional Protocol II represented 
the first international instrument dedicated to the protection of victims of 
non-international armed conflicts. With the Geneva Conventions having 
been ratified universally and the 1977 Additional Protocols ratified by the 
vast majority of states, the international community has voiced its 
commitment to the principles contained in these instruments and to 
respecting and ensuring the respect of IHL.4 
 
and other situations of violence; it currently has offices in 80 countries with over 12,000 staff 
worldwide. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE ICRC: ITS MISSION AND WORK 3-5 (2009), http:// 
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0963/$File/ICRC_002_0963.PDF. 
 2. The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement were adopted by the 
25th International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in October 1986 and as amended in 1995 and 
2006. Statutes of the Int’l Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, http://www.icrc.org/Web/ 
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/statutes-movement-220506/$File/Statutes-EN-A5.pdf (last visited May 19, 
2010). 
 3. The “Law of The Hague” establishes the rights and obligations of belligerents in the conduct 
of military operations and limits the means of harming the adversary. JENNIFER ELSEA, CRS REP. FOR 
CONG., TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31191.pdf. It includes the 1899 Hague 
Conventions respecting the laws and customs of war on land and the adaptation to maritime warfare and 
the principles of the 1864 Geneva Convention, as well as the 1907 Review of the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and adoption of new Conventions. Id. 
 4. At the time of writing, the Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified, and 164 States 
have ratified Additional Protocol I; 168 have ratified Additional Protocol II; and 40 have ratified 
Additional Protocol III. ICRC.org, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
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However, in recent times, armed conflicts have given rise to new 
challenges and to new humanitarian concerns. The realities of modern day 
armed conflicts have also fuelled the debate as to the adequacy of IHL in 
the face of an evolving tapestry of conflict. 
Indeed, it could be argued that starting in the early 1990s, there has 
been a notable shift away from the manner in which conflicts were 
traditionally fought, with new actors, new weapons and new tactics. 
Contemporary armed conflicts are vastly different creatures from those 
prevailing in the first part of the twentieth century, when states negotiated 
the texts of the Geneva Conventions. Gone are the days when the 
belligerents were often easily recognizable and were predominantly 
members of the regular armed forces of the states confronting one another, 
as was the case during the First and Second World Wars. Those actively 
engaged in the fighting then were usually soldiers who stood apart from 
civilians, and civilians were not seen to be taking any direct part in the 
hostilities. Combatants would wear military uniforms and carry their 
weapons openly. 
Presently, most armed conflicts are not fought between states in such a 
traditional fashion. A wide range of highly complex and drawn-out internal 
conflicts of low intensity are replacing interstate warfare.5 Most conflicts 
usually involve at least one organized non-state armed group, without a 
clear start or end to the hostilities. Questions of transnational terrorism 
further add fuel to the fire of violence. Indeed, over the past decade we 
have witnessed the advent of the so-called global fight against terrorism, 
also referred to as the global war against al Qaeda and its affiliates. 
With this metamorphosis of conflicts, it was suggested that certain 
aspects of IHL were inadequate to deal with the realities of modern 
warfare.6 IHL was deemed too outdated to effectively address the threats 
faced in the fight against terrorism.7 Thus for instance, much was written 
 
 5. For example, see the complex situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Darfur 
region of Sudan. 
 6. See, e.g., John H. Richardson, Alberto Gonzalez: What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE, Dec. 9, 2009 
(quoting former Attorney General Gonzalez: “I used the word quaint in referring to provisions in the 
Geneva Conventions that require the signatories to provide the prisoners of war privileges like 
commissary privileges, scientific instruments, athletic uniforms. I think those provisions are quaint. I 
did not say nor did I intend to say that the basic principles of the Geneva Conventions in providing for 
humane treatment were quaint. So if I had to do it again, what I would not do is use the word quaint and 
the Geneva Conventions in the same sentence.”); Ronald Watson, Geneva Accords Quaint and 
Obsolete, Legal Aide Told Bush, TIMESONLINE, May 19, 2004, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
news/world/iraq/article426900.ece (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
 7. See, e.g., Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring) 
(“War is a challenge to law, and the law must adjust. It must recognize that the old wineskins of 
WILLIAMSON_JCI_1.DOC 6/11/2010  3:27:53 PM 
460 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:457 
about the sufficiency of IHL to tackle the transnational threat posed by 
terrorism. For the ICRC, there was no one size fits all approach to 
answering this question. Each situation of violence, whether part of the so 
called global fight against terrorism or not, needs to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis. In other words, only by looking at the facts on the ground, at 
the parties involved, and nature of the violence, could it be determined 
whether and to what extent IHL applied to the situation. Individuals at war 
in the legal sense would be protected by International Humanitarian Law. 
Outside of legal war, protection would be afforded by other bodies of law, 
such as human rights law and domestic law.8 
I. SOME CLARIFICATION PROCESSES 
Seeking to address some of the challenges posed to IHL by 
contemporary armed conflicts, in 2003, the ICRC presented a report to the 
28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, intended 
to generate reflection and debate about some of the issues.9 In the view of 
the ICRC, the four Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, other IHL 
treaties, as well as norms of international customary law, provided a 
bedrock of principles and rules that must continue to guide the conduct of 
hostilities and the treatment of persons who have fallen into the hands of a 
party to an armed conflict.10 In 2007, the ICRC explained further that this 
body of law “reflect[s] a reasonable and pragmatic balance between the 
demands of military necessity and those of humanity.”11 For the ICRC, the 
challenges to IHL were not to be resolved through development of IHL per 
se, but rather through clarification and further elaboration of the rules and 
principles contained in this body of law. 
The ICRC identified a number of issues raised by modern-day armed 
conflicts that warranted possible further clarification. These included 
procedural principles and safeguards for internment or administrative 
 
international law, domestic criminal procedure, or other prior frameworks are ill-suited to the bitter 
wine of this new warfare.”). 
 8. See Jakob Kellenberger, Challenges Faced by the ICRC and Int’l Humanitarian Law (IHL), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/kellenberger-statement-191006) (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2010). Jakob Kellenberger was the President of the ICRC at Georgetown University in 
Washington, D.C. Id. 
 9. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS (2003), http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5TALFN/$File/Reaf%20and%20dev-Main%20report-Oct%202003.pdf. 
 10. Id. 
 11. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES OF ARMED CONFLICTS 4 (2007), http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ 
ihl-30-international-conference-101207/$File/IHL-challenges-30th-International-Conference-ENG.pdf. 
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detention, particularly in connection with the fight against terrorism, the 
regulation of private military and security companies, increasing the 
respect for IHL and the role of sanctions. They also covered aspects of the 
conduct of hostilities, including the use of certain weapons such as cluster 
munitions, direct participation in hostilities and the protection of persons in 
the midst of non-international armed conflicts.12 
This process of clarification is a work in progress, though there have 
already been certain notable outcomes. In 2005, the ICRC issued a set of 
procedural principles and safeguards applicable to any situation of 
internment. These have been relied upon by the ICRC in its operational 
dialogue with detaining authorities in a number of contexts.13 
In 2008, as the outcome of an initiative launched cooperatively by the 
Government of Switzerland and the ICRC, the Montreux Document on 
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During 
Armed Conflict was published.14 
Also in 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted by 
107 states at a diplomatic conference held in Dublin, Ireland, and opened 
for signature on December 3, 2008 at a treaty signing ceremony in Oslo, 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative 
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 858 at 379 
(2005), quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407. 
 14. Letter, General Assembly Security Council, Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/467–S/2008/636 (Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Montreux Document]. The document was developed 
with the participation of governmental experts from Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, and the United States of America in meetings 
convened in January and November 2006, November 2007, and April and September 2008. A number 
of representatives of civil society, NGOs, and of the private military and security industry were 
consulted as part of the process. There are currently 34 states that support the Montreux Document. 
Seventeen states jointly finalized the document on the occasion of a concluding meeting in Montreux, 
Switzerland, on September 17, 2008. The following additional states have joined the Montreux 
Document since its release, with date of communication of support: Macedonia (Feb. 3, 2009), Ecuador 
(Feb. 12, 2009), Albania (Feb. 17, 2009), the Netherlands (Feb. 20, 2009), Bosnia and Herzegowina 
(Mar. 9, 2009), Greece (Mar. 13, 2009), Portugal (Mar. 27, 2009), Chile (Apr. 6, 2009), Uruguay (Apr. 
22, 2009), Liechtenstein (Apr. 27, 2009), Qatar (Apr. 30, 2009), Jordan (May 18, 2009), Spain (May 20, 
2009), Italy (June 15, 2009), Uganda (July 23, 2009), Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2009), Georgia (Oct. 22, 2009). 
Participating States of the Montreux Document, http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/ 
intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2010). 
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Norway. To date, it has been ratified by 32 states, and it will enter into 
force on August 1, 2010.15 
More recently, in May 2009, the ICRC issued its Interpretive 
Guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law (the “Guidance”). 
To be sure, the realization of each of these outcomes has not been 
without debate and some interesting exchanges. However, given the 
complexity of contemporary armed conflicts, this discussion is to be 
expected. The more contentious area, and the more troubling from a 
humanitarian perspective, relates to the loss of protection of civilians who 
directly participated in hostilities. 
II. DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
Under IHL, parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between 
civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants, 
and cannot be directed against civilians.16 However, civilians can lose their 
protection from direct attack when and “for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities.”17 The immunity from direct attack to which civilians are 
entitled is one of the lynchpins of IHL. Civilians do not lose their immunity 
for mere contribution to the general war effort, usually carried out far from 
the battlefield. However, their protection is granted subject to their 
 
 15. The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of 
Cluster Munitions. It is the result of the “Oslo-process” which was launched in February 2007, when 
forty-six States agreed to the Oslo Declaration which reads: “Conclude by 2008 a legally binding 
international instrument that prohibits the use and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians and secure adequate provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and 
clearance of contaminated areas.” Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, Declaration, Feb. 22-23, 
2007, available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/Oslo%20DeclarationFeb07.pdf. 
 16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51(1) and 52(2), June 8, 1977 
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13(2), June 8, 1977 [hereinafter 
Protocol II]. See also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME I: RULES 8-11 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) 
[hereinafter HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK]; see also JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, INT’L 
AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 16 (2009) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL 
LAW HANDBOOK] (“Sometimes referred to as the principle of discrimination, this principle requires that 
combatants be distinguished from non combatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from 
protected property or protected places. In keeping with this ‘grandfather’ principle of the [Law of War], 
parties to a conflict must direct their operations only against combatants and military objectives.”) 
 17. Protocol I, supra note 16, art. 15(3); Protocol II, supra note 16, art. 13(3). See also 
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 16, at 19-24. 
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abstention from all direct participation in hostilities during armed conflicts. 
Failure to do so leaves them open to direct attack.18 
With the changing nature of warfare though, there has been not only 
increased civilian involvement in acts closely related to actual combat, but 
also a lessening distinction between civilians and belligerents, especially on 
the side of non-state actors involved in non-international armed conflicts. 
With this blurring of actors, determining who is a lawful target becomes a 
much more complex assessment for the parties to the conflict. This blurring 
also puts civilians at greater risk of being in harm’s way during the 
hostilities. 
The Guidance, an institutional publication of the ICRC, represented 
the outcome of an expert process conducted from 2003 to 2008. The ICRC 
held several meetings during this period which brought together nearly 50 
legal experts from academic, military, governmental, and non-
governmental circles, all of whom attended in their personal capacity.19 The 
Guidance is influenced by the expert discussions, but does not necessarily 
reflect a majority opinion of the participating experts on the various issues 
addressed.20 
As explained in its introduction, the Guidance interprets the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities for the purposes of the conduct of 
hostilities only.21 In other words, the Guidance focuses on whether and for 
how long a person is considered to have lost protection from direct attack 
because he or she is directly participating in hostilities. The Guidance does 
not look at what happens to an individual after he has directly participated 
in hostilities, and for instance finds himself detained by the adversary. 
The Guidance presents ten recommendations, from defining who is a 
civilian in armed conflicts to explaining that which constitutes direct 
participation in hostilities and the consequence of so participating. Without 
 
 18. JEAN PICTET ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 §§ 1942-1945 (1987) [hereinafter PICTET COMMENTARY]. 
 19. All materials produced in the course of the expert process are available at www.icrc.org. 
 20. As explained in the Introduction to the Guidance: “The Interpretive Guidance is widely 
informed by the discussions held during these expert meetings but does not necessarily reflect a 
unanimous view or majority opinion of the experts. It endeavours to propose a balanced and practical 
solution that takes into account the wide variety of concerns involved and, at the same time, ensures a 
clear and coherent interpretation of the law consistent with the purposes and principles of IHL. 
Ultimately, the responsibility for the Interpretive Guidance is assumed by the ICRC as a neutral and 
independent humanitarian organization mandated by the international community of States to promote 
and work for a better understanding of IHL.” INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 9-10 (2009) [hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at http:// 
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0990/$File/ICRC_002_0990.PDF. 
 21. Id. at 10-11. 
WILLIAMSON_JCI_1.DOC 6/11/2010  3:27:53 PM 
464 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:457 
seeking to be comprehensive, the following is an overview of the 
recommendations and of some of the questions that arose during the expert 
process. 
The first recommendation defines civilians in international armed 
conflict as being “all persons who are neither members of the armed forces 
of a party to the conflict nor participants in a levée en masse.”22 Similarly, 
in the context of non-international armed conflicts, the second 
recommendation states that civilians are “all persons who are not members 
of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict 
and are therefore entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”23 
The Guidance explains that in non-international armed conflicts, 
organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-state party to 
the conflict and consist only of individuals whose constant function is to 
take a direct part in hostilities, or, in other words, individuals who have a 
continuous combat function. This functional, rather than membership, 
approach takes into the account the reality of structures and membership of 
irregularly constituted groups, where membership is rarely formal or made 
obvious through the wearing of uniforms or fixed insignia. As such, the 
Guidance notes that other factors should be taken into account. Repeated 
direct participation in hostilities, for instance, may be an indicator of 
having a continuous combat function. In case of doubt, the individual must 
be considered a civilian entitled to protection from direct attack. 
Individuals accompanying and supporting such organized groups and 
whose functions do not involve direct participation in hostilities remain 
civilians, and are not subject to direct attack. Examples of such civilians 
include recruiters, trainers, and financiers, as well as purchasers and 
smugglers of equipment. Of course, by virtue of accompanying the 
organised armed groups, they may be at greater risk of being in harm’s way 
during hostilities. Nonetheless, as with other civilians, they remain 
protected from “direct attack unless and for such time as they directly 
participate in hostilities.”24 
In the same vein, recommendation three states that private contractors 
and civilian “employees of a party to an armed conflict who are 
 
 22. Id. at 20. Members of a levée en masse are “[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on 
the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had 
time to form themselves into regular armed units provided that they carry arms openly and respect the 
laws and customs of war.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(6), 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 23. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 27. 
 24. Id. at 34-35. 
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civilians . . . are entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”25 However, their 
activities and presence alongside the armed forces and military objectives 
may expose them to an increased risk of incidental death or injury.26 
This reading of the status of personnel of Private Military and Security 
Companies (“PMSCs”) reflects the conclusion of the Montreux Document 
on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During 
Armed Conflict.27 According to the Montreux Document, the status of the 
personnel of private security and military contractors in armed conflict 
situations is to be determined by International Humanitarian Law on a case-
by-case basis, with particular regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
functions in which they are involved. However, there is a presumption that 
personnel of PMSCs are protected as civilians under IHL unless they are 
incorporated into the regular armed forces of a state or are members of 
organized armed forces, groups or units under a command responsible to 
the state. As with other civilians under IHL, personnel of PMSCs may not 
be the object of attack, unless and for such time as they directly participate 
in hostilities. 
Recommendations four, five, and six look specifically at the nature of 
the acts that could constitute direct participation in hostilities and seek to 
provide temporal as well as geographical outer limits to specific acts. The 
fourth recommendation sets the standard, by explaining that the “[n]otion 
of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by 
individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed 
conflict.”28 Recommendation five of the Guidance then advances 
cumulative criteria to be met for an act to qualify as direct participation in 
hostilities, termed as (i) threshold of harm, (ii) direct causation, and (iii) 
belligerent nexus. First, “the act must be likely to adversely affect the 
military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, 
alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects 
protected against direct attack.”29 Second, “there must be a direct causal 
link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or 
from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an 
integral part.”30 And third, “the act must be specifically designed to directly 
 
 25. Id. at 37. 
 26. Id. at 38. 
 27. See Montreux Document, supra note 14. 
 28. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 43-45. 
 29. Id. at 47. 
 30. Id. at 51. 
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cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict 
and to the detriment of another.”31 
Finally, recommendation six provides guidance as to the beginning 
and end of an act said to constitute direct participation in hostilities by 
stipulating that “measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of 
direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the 
return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that 
act.”32 
During discussions on the direct causation criteria, experts were 
careful to draw a distinction between direct participation in hostilities and 
indirect participation—notably, assisting the general war effort and war 
sustaining activities. While some forms of indirect participation may 
adversely affect the military effort of a party to the conflict, according to 
the Guidance, indirect participation does not entail the loss of protection 
from direct attack.33 
This distinction between acts merely building the military capacity of 
one of the parties to the conflict and those acts intended to actually cause 
harm was discussed during the experts meetings.34 According to this 
distinction, a civilian worker in an ammunitions factory is not directly 
participating in hostilities, but merely supporting the general war effort. 
Unlike the civilian who actually uses the ammunition to harm the 
adversary, the factory worker has not lost his protection under IHL and is 
not subject to direct attack. Other examples of indirect forms of 
participation that were cited include design, production, and shipment of 
weapons and military equipment, recruitment and training of personnel, 
and political propaganda. The experts felt that whether an act had 
“sufficient” causal link to qualify as direct participation in hostilities could 
not be objectively measured, and had to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis.35 
 
 31. Id. at 58. 
 32. Id. at 65. 
 33. Id. at 54-56. 
 34. See, e.g., INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE THIRD EXPERT 
MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES (2005), available at http:// 
www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-article-020709/$File/2005-09-report-
dph-2005-icrc.pdf. 
 35. For a similar approach, see The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of 
Defence (Oxford University Press 2004), at 5.3.3: Whether civilians are taking a direct part in hostilities 
is a question of fact. Civilians manning an anti-aircraft gun or engaging in sabotage of military 
installations are doing so. Civilians working in military vehicle maintenance depots or munitions 
factories or driving military transport vehicles are not, but they are at risk from attacks on those 
objectives since military objectives may be attacked whether or not civilians are present. 
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It was also indicated by experts that the direct causation standard 
should not be equated with a “but for” test or with “aiding and abetting,” 
given that both of these would include activities which the experts agreed 
would be indirect rather than direct participation.36 Indeed, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) has described direct participation in hostilities as “acts of war 
which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the 
personnel or equipment of the enemy’s armed forces. Such an enquiry must 
be undertaken on a case-by-case basis . . . .”37 
Recommendations six and seven delve into the temporal parameters of 
direct participation in hostilities. Recommendation six was discussed in 
part above. Recommendation seven states that 
[c]ivilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each 
specific act amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas 
members of organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party to 
an armed conflict cease to be civilians and lose protection against 
direct attack for as long as they assume their continuous combat 
function.38 
The scope of the loss of protection, both in terms of the integral elements of 
each specific act, as well in relation to civilians who participate in 
hostilities in a recurrent manner, was one of the more difficult issues to be 
analyzed. IHL indicates that civilians can be the subject of attack “for such 
time” as they directly participate in hostilities, and that they regain 
protection thereafter. As explained in the commentary to Additional 
Protocol I, “[i]f a civilian participates directly in hostilities, it is clear that 
he will not enjoy any protection against attacks for as long as his 
participation lasts. Thereafter, as he no longer presents any danger for the 
adversary, he may not be attacked.”39 During the experts’ meetings there 
was much discussion on the parameters of the beginning and end of direct 
participation for each act. This also gave rise to the consideration of the 
‘revolving door’ concept, whereby civilians lose protection only for such 
time as they engage in direct participation in hostilities.40 
 
 36. Id. at 34. 
 37. Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ICTY, § 178 (17 July 2008). 
 38. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 70-73. 
 39. PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 18, § 4789. 
 40. See, e.g., INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIFTH EXPERT 
MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 33-44 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 
Report], available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-article-
020709/$File/2008-05-report-dph-2008-icrc.pdf. 
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The first question in essence then, is when does direct participation 
effectively start and end? Can it be said that direct participation is limited 
to the actual execution of the hostile act itself, for instance the actual laying 
and detonating of the Improvised Explosive Device (“IED”), or does it also 
include the build up to the act of direct participation, for instance 
assembling the IED in a garage for use the next day, as well the 
deployment to and return from the location of the act? 
The Guidance recognizes that civilians can be subject to attack when 
undertaking preparatory measures to the execution of the act, deploying to 
the location and returning from the location of the execution of the act. 
Preparatory acts are simply described with reference to Article 44(3) of 
Additional Protocol I, as acts which are of a specifically military nature and 
so closely linked to the subsequent execution of the hostile act that they 
already constitute an integral part of that act.41 The discussions of the 
experts demonstrated the challenge in coming up with a workable standard 
and timeframe. It was recognized that utmost care was needed in making 
the determinations, balancing the humanitarian consequence of subjecting 
an individual to direct attack against the need for the military to attack 
during preparatory phases, seeing that this could be the only opportunity to 
deter and defeat a lethal attack.42 
In terms of deployment to the act, the Guidance indicates that, where a 
specific act requires prior geographic deployment, the deployment is 
considered an integral part of the act in question to the extent that the 
physical displacement is undertaken with a view to carry out a specific 
operation.43 
Concerning the end of the act, according to the Guidance, an 
individual is no longer directly participating in hostilities when he has 
physically separated from the operation, notably by laying down his 
weapons and resuming activities distinct from that operation.44 As with 
preparatory acts, the experts agreed that utmost care had to be taken, as 
well as situational pragmatism exercised, when deciding whether a civilian 
had effectively “returned” and regained protection from direct attack. To 
engage such civilians long after their withdrawal, when they no longer 
posed a threat, could be viewed as coming close to punishment. On the 
 
 41. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 65-67. 
 42. INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FOURTH EXPERT MEETING 
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 60-61 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 REPORT], 
available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-article-020709/$File/ 
2006-03-report-dph-2006-icrc.pdf. 
 43. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 67. 
 44. Id. at 67-68. 
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other hand, expecting armed forces not to attack individuals who had 
directly participated in hostilities as soon as they started withdrawing from 
the location, could give rise to other operational and humanitarian 
concerns, especially in guerrilla warfare situations with increased risks to 
civilians.45 
To recap, a civilian loses protection when and for such time as he 
directly participates in hostilities. After the commission of the act, 
protection from direct attack is restored. What if the civilian’s engagement 
is not a solitary incident? Does the civilian regain protection between each 
engagement, only to lose it when actual direct participation is occurring, or 
is the civilian subject to direct attacks even during the interval periods? The 
Guidance explains that unlike members of organized armed groups who 
lose protection for as long as they assume a continuous combat function, 
the loss of protection of civilians who directly participate in hostilities is 
only temporarily suspended, and not continuous.46 Circumstances in the 
battlefield are complex and ever changing. As such, even if a civilian has 
repeatedly participated in hostilities, future conduct is likely to be difficult 
to anticipate. Of course, if an individual repeatedly and in an organized 
manner, rather than sporadically and spontaneously, directly participates in 
hostilities, it could be argued that his behaviour is more akin to someone 
with a continuous combat function, such as a member of an organized 
armed group.47 
For a number of experts, this “revolving door” concept was 
problematic.48 It was suggested that it was operationally untenable to argue 
that civilians could “‘opt in’ and ‘opt out’ of the conduct of hostilities,” 
especially if they were to participate not just once, but twice or thrice.49 For 
these experts, such repeated engagement represented “a ‘continuous mode’ 
of direct participation in hostilities.”50 An example given of such 
continuous engagement was the “civilian who fired at a military convoy 
from a hiding position and who then returned home just to conceal his 
weapon and wait for the next occasion to ambush a convoy.”51 
 
 45. 2006 Report, supra note 42, at 61-63. 
 46. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 70. 
 47. Id. at 71. 
 48. 2008 Report, supra note 40, at 36. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 38. 
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With the concept of hostile intent included in the rules of engagement 
of a number of armed forces, such viewpoints arguably muster weight.52 
Indeed, operationally, soldiers might be endangered were they to wait for a 
civilian, who has on a number of previous occasions directly participated in 
hostilities, to commit another hostile act before engaging. Yet, on the other 
hand, it may be that the civilian is no longer a threat, for instance because 
he was previously forced by insurgents to participate in hostilities, and 
therefore should be entitled to protection. Recognizing these difficult 
operational realities, the Guidance underscores the need to protect civilians 
from erroneous or arbitrary attacks. 
Given that an individual directly participating in hostilities is subject 
to direct attack, possibly through the use of lethal force, recommendations 
eight and nine speak to the precautions that must be taken before and 
during the attacks and to the restraints that must be exercised during the use 
of force.53 As such, all feasible precautions must be taken in determining 
whether a person is a civilian and, if so, whether that civilian is directly 
participating in hostilities. “[F]easible precautions are understood to be 
those that are practicable or practically possible taking all the 
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
precautions.”54 In case of doubt, the person must be presumed to be 
protected against direct attack. Feasible precautions as to whether a civilian 
is directly participating in hostilities are to be taken not only before the 
launching of an attack, but also during the attack, so that it can be 
suspended if it appears that the civilian is in fact entitled to protection.55 
Recommendation nine also notes that, “[i]n addition to the restraints 
imposed by international humanitarian law on specific means and methods 
of warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions that may arise 
under other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree of 
force which is permissible against persons [who are] not entitled to 
protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary 
to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing 
circumstances.”56 The reports of the experts’ meetings reflect the extensive 
discussions that surrounded the inclusion of this recommendation and its 
 
 52. Hostile intent is defined as “the threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US 
forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede 
the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.” 
See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 75. 
 53. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 74-82. 
 54. 2006 Report, supra note 42, at 69. 
 55. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 74. 
 56. Id. at 77. 
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legal basis.57 In including the recommendation, the ICRC explained notably 
that “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to 
refrain from giving him an opportunity to surrender where there is 
manifestly no necessity for the use of lethal force.”58 
Finally, recommendation ten explains the loss of protection from 
direct attack is temporary, to the extent that it is linked to when the 
individual is directly participating in hostilities or to his or her continuous 
combat function in an organized armed group.59 When civilians cease to 
directly participate in hostilities, or when members of organized armed 
groups belonging to a non-state party to an armed conflict cease to assume 
their continuous combat function, they regain full civilian protection 
against direct attack, but they are not exempted from prosecution for 
violations of domestic and international law they may have committed. 
As indicated above, the Guidance reflects the ICRC’s position of how 
existing law should be interpreted and is not an attempt to change existing 
rules of customary and treaty IHL. The many views expressed by the 
experts during the various meetings highlighted the myriad difficulties of 
trying to address this delicate as well as emotive aspect of IHL: the 
mingling of belligerents amongst the civilian population increases the risk 
of erroneous targeting of civilians, but also makes the task of military 
personnel that much more difficult as they operate in hostile and complex 
environments. 
CONCLUSION 
A greater presence of non-state actors in contemporary armed 
conflicts has given risen to new humanitarian concerns regarding the 
protection of civilians and has created new challenges to ensuring the 
respect of IHL. In the fog of modern wars, finding the right balance 
between humanity and military necessity can be difficult, but it is essential 
to do so if the suffering and destruction caused by war are to be limited. 
 
 
 57. See 2008 Report, supra note 40, at 7-32. 
 58. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 82. 
 59. Id. at 83-85. 
